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1 How (not) to talk about technology
International Relations and the
question of agency
Matthias Leese & Marijn Hoijtink
In recent years, advances in both physical (i.e. engineering and robotics)
and digital (i.e. artificial intelligence and machine learning) aspects of tech-
nology have led to the development of powerful new technologies such as
so-called Autonomous Weapons Systems (AWS), algorithmic software tools
for counterterrorism and security, or “smart” CCTV surveillance. These and
other technologies have potentially profound repercussions for the ways in
which action in international politics becomes possible, the ways in which
relations between states become structured, and the ways in which wars are
fought, security is produced, and peace is made and maintained. Accord-
ingly, algorithmic and robotic technologies1 have received much attention
from the discipline of International Relations (IR), but also from the policy-
making world, the media, and the public. Debates thereby predominantly
revolve around the claim that such technologies could to a large extent act
autonomously, i.e. without human input when it comes to tasks like identi-
fying and engaging military targets, searching for indicators of terrorist
activity within large datasets, or analyzing live video footage for deviant
behavior. This means that technologies are ascribed the general capacity to
act and to create an impact in the world. In other words, they are believed
to have agency that is predicated upon the ability to collect information
about the world through sensors or data input, and to interact with the
world on the basis of this information.
Such an assumption would run counter to the modernist presupposition
that agency (defined by the Oxford Dictionary as “action or intervention
producing a particular effect”) could be exclusively found in humans, as
humans would be the only species capable of reflexive thinking capacities,
and therefore self-consciousness and free will. From this perspective, ascrib-
ing agency to technologies (or other non-human elements) creates a set of
quite fundamental problems: if – staying within the above examples –
machines would make decisions about what to define as a legitimate mili-
tary target, who should be considered a potential terrorist, or what kind of
behavior would warrant interventions by state authorities, then who could
and should be morally, legally, politically, or economically held accountable
and responsible for these decisions and their consequences? In turn, these
and similar considerations have direct implications for international politics.
Should AWS, for example, be preventively banned or integrated into exist-
ing non-proliferation regimes? How are international security practices
informed and structured by global data collection programs and algorithmic
number-crunching? And what kind of public order is being engendered by
behavioral analysis in CCTV systems, possibly combined with other features
such as automated face recognition software? Presupposed machine agency
in the sense of autonomous action would seriously challenge the status of
(international) politics as a domain of human activity.
A closer look at how technologies “act” however usually reveals that they do
not do so in an autonomous fashion, after all. Military drones are operated
and supervised by a whole team of human staff on the ground. Counterterror-
ism software tools need to be developed, implemented, maintained, and fed
with data on a daily basis by human analysts. And alerts produced by surveil-
lance systems still need to be validated and acted upon by human security offi-
cers. This means that most technologies are, in fact, rather working with
humans than in the place of humans. They assist, pre-structure, point out and
make suggestions. They do the “heavy lifting,” take care of both complex and
challenging tasks as well as dull and monotonous ones, and sometimes they
“extend” human cognition by giving us access to additional information that
we cannot sense ourselves. But in the end, humans and technologies enable
each other in order to create an impact in the world. Technologies should
therefore, in the sense of the workload distribution that characterizes them,
best be conceptualized as “socio-technical systems” (Law, 1991) that are com-
prised of heterogeneous human and non-human elements.
Such an understanding of technology – while acknowledging complexity
and context sensitivity of (political) action – does, however, not resolve the
question of agency in relation to algorithmic and robotic technologies.
Clearly, when machines or computer systems do things that their human
operators cannot do (or do not want to do), they play a role in how action
is constituted and how meaning is produced. Hence, there is a need to
study the ways in which technologies have, and exercise, agency. Technolo-
gies are political agents – not in a liberal sense that would presuppose that
they act as conscious subjects whose actions are predicated upon volition
and free will, but in the sense that they have effects on political action. This
may seem a banal claim. Yet, we find that in the discipline of IR two
broader tendencies have long prevented such a conceptualization of technol-
ogy within international politics.
The first tendency is the predominantly determinist reading of technology
throughout the history of IR. From classic works such as Ogburn’s Technol-
ogy and International Relations (1949b) or Skolnikoff’s Science, Technology,
and American Foreign Policy (1967) to more recent contributions, most ana-
lyses are in fact predicated upon the assumption that technology is either
fully controlled by humans or alternatively placed outside of human agency
(McCarthy, 2013, 2018). While neatly fitting in with a prevailing scientific
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understanding of analysis (i.e. causal and mechanistic) throughout main-
stream IR (Jackson, 2017), such a treatment of technology does however
not sit well vis-à-vis algorithmic and robotic technologies and the acknow-
ledgment of complexity and human-machine interactions within socio-tech-
nical systems. In order to overcome the externalization of technology as an
explanatory variable in IR and to render it “endogeneous” to international
politics, a number of scholars have thus suggested to unpack technology by
foregrounding its construction, implementation, and use. Such a holistic
approach would then enable us to account for the politics that go into tech-
nology, as well as for the politics that emanate from technology (e.g., Her-
rera, 2003; Fritsch, 2011).2
The second tendency that has prevented a stronger analytical appreciation
of technology in international politics is the conceptualization of agency within
IR. IR scholars have long been concerned with the “agent-structure problem”
(Wendt, 1987), i.e. the question of whether human action should be seen as the
decisive element for the analysis of international politics, or whether human
action would always already be pre-defined and constrained by the social struc-
tures in which it is embedded. In an attempt to overcome this duality of agency
and structure, Jackson and Nexon (1999) have proposed to turn to a relational
analysis of action that, rather than asking what international actors do, fore-
grounds who these actors are and how their agency is produced. This relation-
alist turn has paved the way for a re-appreciation of (political) agency as
emergent and dynamic rather than static and pre-determined. Moreover, it
allows us to move away from an understanding of agency as an attribute (that
would need to be located within someone or something) and towards an under-
standing of agency as a product of interaction. In other words: agency does
not precede action, but action constitutes agency. Most importantly, however,
it speaks to the acknowledgment that agency must not necessarily be exclusive
to humans enables us to account for technology and its politicality through the
study of interaction within socio-technical systems.
The aim of this book – based on the premises to (1) unpack technologies
in order to render them political, and (2) to understand agency as some-
thing that is produced through interaction – is to ask how technologies
(co-)produce, alter, transform, and distribute agency within international polit-
ics. Working through the notion of agency and its transformations against the
backdrop of algorithmic and robotic technologies thereby allows us to recon-
sider the ways in which technology has been treated in IR. A focus on agency
moreover serves as a common denominator for the variegated theoretical and
conceptual approaches that scholars in IR have more recently taken up to
study technology, including the likes of “Social Construction of Technology”
(SCOT, Bijker et al., 1987), “Actor-Network Theory” (ANT, Callon, 1984;
Latour, 2005), “co-production” (Jasanoff, 2004), “performativity” (Butler,
2010), “vibrancy” (Bennett, 2010), “mangle” (Pickering, 1993), “intra-action”
(Barad, 2007), “configuration” (Suchman, 2007), or post-human approaches
(Cudworth and Hobden, 2013).
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The contributions to the book provide in-depth explorations of the entan-
gled and multi-layered ways in which humans and technologies interact,
work together, and mutually empower and/or constrain each other. In this
vein they offer a variety of theoretical and empirical accounts of Technology
and Agency in International Relations, including questions of theory-building
and empirical analysis that emanate from Jasanoff’s notion of “co-construc-
tion” (Jacobsen and Monsees), the boundary work between humans and
non-humans in military weapons systems (Leese), the mediation of security
governance through the production and analysis of satellite imagery
(Olbrich), the effects of practices of drone warfare on how military oper-
ators perceive the world (Edney-Browne), the role of blockchain technology
for international financial regulation (Campbell-Verduyn), the design of
algorithms for crime forecasting and intelligence (Kaufmann), and the emer-
gence of large IT infrastructure systems for border management (Glouft-
sios). The book concludes with an interview with Claudia Aradau, who
discusses technology and agency in relation to her own work on materiality,
Big Data and algorithmic security, and explores a number of questions con-
cerning politics, ethics, and methodology vis-à-vis the discipline of IR.
This introduction proceeds in three steps. First, we briefly revisit IR’s
grand theoretical debates (i.e. realism, liberalism, and constructivism) and
pay specific attention to the ways in which technology within these frame-
works has been treated in a deterministic and externalized fashion. Subse-
quently, we discuss the agency-structure debate and the turn towards
relational analyses. We then explore more recent influences from STS and
New Materialism into IR, and analyze how these approaches help us to
study technology and agency in international politics.
Technology in IR: determinism and externalization
IR’s answers to “the question concerning technology,” to borrow from Hei-
degger’s (1977) seminal essay, have come with quite a degree of variance,
depending on assumptions about the essence of the international system,
the possibilities and conditions for change or stability, and the general rela-
tionship between technology, politics, and society. As Ogburn (1949a: 18)
has argued as early as in 1949, “in international relations the variables often
stressed are leaders, personalities, social movements, and organizations.
These are important variables in explaining particular actions and specific
achievements. But because of their significance the variations of techno-
logical factors should not be obscured.” In Technology and International
Relations – an early attempt to create a systematized account of the role of
technology in global affairs – Ogburn (1949a: 16) illustrates the presumed
causal influence of technological tools on world politics as follows:
Few doubt that the early acquisition of steam power by the British
before other states acquired it helped them to become the leading world
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power of the nineteenth century and thereby made the task of British
diplomacy much easier. Britain’s steel mills, with their products for
peace and for war, enabled her to spread much more effectively the
ways of European civilization into Africa and southern and southeast-
ern Asia.
Ogburn’s account notably set the tone for ensuing realist engagements with
technology – and particularly military technology – as a capabilities-enhan-
cing variable that provides states with a power edge vis-à-vis other states in
the international arena. As for realist and neorealist IR scholars, the inter-
national system is characterized by an anarchic structure that produces
fierce competition between rivaling nation–states (Morgenthau, 1948; Waltz,
1979), the absence of rules (and/or their enforceability), the will to survive,
and the lack of certainty about the intentions of other states (Mearsheimer,
1994). As the hierarchy within the international system is determined by the
power capacities of states, the question of power and its acquisition is cen-
tral. Power is in this sense usually conceptualized in terms of military and
economic capacities. Technology is within realist and neorealist accounts of
international politics then mainly treated as a tool that enhances state
power, for instance through upgrades of military equipment (e.g., longer
missile range, higher firing rates, more protective armor), or improved effi-
ciency of economic means of production.
In the realist paradigm, technology has the capacity to become a game
changer within the international system and its study has been put center
stage by many during the Cold War period. Against the backdrop of
technological competition between the West and the East (e.g., the arms
race, the space race), the (sub-)discipline of Strategic Studies primarily
evolved around the study of the influence of military technologies on power
distribution within global politics. As Buzan (1987: 6) argues, “the subject
matter of Strategic Studies arises from two fundamental variables affecting
the international system: its political structure, and the nature of the pre-
vailing technologies available to the political actors within it.” Whereas
questions of the political structure of the international sphere were con-
sidered a task for traditional IR, the technological component of inter-
national security had to be, according to Buzan (1987: 8), discussed by
scholars of Strategic Studies focusing on the “variable of military technol-
ogy.” Independent of whether one considers the study of technology to be a
unique feature of the dedicated (sub-)field of Security Studies, or alterna-
tively as a core concern of IR, the distinction made by Buzan indicates that
the political structure of the international system is itself not affected by the
availability of technology – an argument that, thus, treats technology as an
externalized explanatory variable for change/stability in the international
system.
This does, of course, not mean that technology would not be seen as import-
ant for international politics. For realists, the political structure influences the
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development and implementation of technology, and technology, in turn, is
widely regarded as a factor determining the military capacities of states and
their strategic options in an international system that is characterized by
anarchy. During the Cold War period, large parts of the IR literature were
in fact dominated by questions about military capacity and the control
thereof, with a particular focus on nuclear technology and the implications
of the availability of the atomic bomb as an unprecedented means of mass
destruction. After the end of the Cold War, the focus of analysis – following
new military strategies vis-à-vis newly available technologies – shifted
increasingly towards the incorporation of information and communication
technologies (ICTs) into military equipment in order to enhance warfighting
capacities of the US military. This so-called Revolution in Military Affairs
(RMA) corresponded closely with more risk-averse political strategies of
Western states that sought to avoid military fatalities, as well as a turn
towards more specialized high-tech troops that would be able to conduct
combat with precision and efficiency (Shaw, 2005). Within concepts
of RMA, information is regarded as the key component that creates an
advantage on the battlefield, as it enables better situational awareness and
enhanced decision-making – both in combat and in military planning
(Gray, 2005).
While a (neo-)realist research agenda on technology is still very much
focused on questions of how technological advancements alter military cap-
acities and therefore potentially bring about changes in international politics
that are predicated upon state power, the increased interest in ICTs bears an
interesting parallel to liberal IR approaches to technology. Starting from a
rather different analytical point of departure, liberal scholars posit that the
international system undergoes a continuing transformation into a net-
worked, interconnected, and interdependent global structure that is
decisively distinct from the anarchic assumptions of the realist tradition
(Rosenau, 1990). Within such processes of transformation, technology is
conceptualized as a major driver that connects actors at multiple levels. As
liberal scholars argue, the time-space compression of globalization has to a
large extent been enabled and accelerated by ICTs and mobility and trans-
portation technologies. These technologies, so the argument goes, have ele-
vated cultural and economic exchange between societies to an
unprecedented level and have thereby strengthened cultural ties on a global
scale (Rosenau and Singh, 2002). Rosenau (1990: 7) describes the “postin-
ternational politics” of a globalized world as
[S]horthand for the changes wrought by global turbulence; for an ever
more dynamic interdependence in which labor is increasingly specialized
and the number of collective actors thereby proliferates; for the central-
izing and decentralizing tendencies that are altering the identity and
number of actors on the world stage; for the shifting orientations that
are transforming authority relations among the actors; and for the
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dynamics of structural bifurcation that are fostering new arrangements
through which the diverse actors pursue their goals.
Whereas most liberal scholars share a general optimism about the possibil-
ities of an interconnected world for the spread of common norms and
values and the general conditions for peace, others have also pointed to the
risks emanating from global connectivity. For example, Der Derian (2003)
foregrounds how information technology has empowered non-state and
non-Western actors, but has at the same time contributed to the profession-
alization of transnational organized crime and terrorism.
In his work on the rise of the network society, Castells (2000) goes as far as
to claim that the structure of the international system has turned away from one
in which states are the dominant actors, towards one that is founded on flows
and networks instead of static and sedimented institutions. In a globalized and
interdependent world, international organizations, NGOs, or multi-national cor-
porations should be recognized as relevant actors on a global scale, as their role
in the regulation of global issues bears witness of novel and complex structures
at the international level. For Fukuyama (1992), in such a world, the increasing
availability of technological means for military purposes and the ensuing poten-
tial for destruction such military technologies have would lead to a redistribution
of power in the sense that differences between actors would be leveled and the
international system would become geared towards more cooperation rather
than conflict.
As technology plays a considerable part in liberal IR theory as the driver
of systemic change, liberalism can be viewed as a helpful attempt to theorize
the status of technology through phenomena such as interdependence,
cooperation, and transnationalism. However, it should be kept in mind that
technology is only one among multiple factors that engender such develop-
ments. Political programs, social change, and cultural influences are
regarded to be just as transformative as the influences of new technologies
when it comes to processes of globalization. For Rosenau, for instance, edu-
cation and politicization of the population is key when it comes to changes
in world politics. As he argues,
although world politics would not be on a new course today if the micro-
electronic and other technological revolutions had not occurred, if the new
interdependence issues had not arisen, if states and governments had not
become weaker, and if subgroupism had not mushroomed, none of these
dynamics would have produced parametric change if adults in every coun-
try and in all walks of life had remained essentially unskilled and detached
with respect to global affairs.
(Rosenau, 1990: 13)
Finally, a different approach to technology in world politics is put forward by
constructivist positions. As constructivism, generally speaking, presupposes
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that the world is “made” by human beings (Onuf, 1989), constructivist IR
scholars suggest that material aspects within international politics do matter,
but that they only acquire meaning in relation to social norms and identities
(e.g., Wendt, 1992; Katzenstein, 1996). This claim is grounded in the assump-
tion that international politics are embedded in a structure that is fundamen-
tally social, and that this structure in turn influences the identities of global
actors. For Wendt (1995), the social structure that underpins international
politics is characterized by shared knowledge, material resources, as well as
practices. His conception of politics presumes that technologies do matter,
but – similar to Rosenau’s reservations – only in conjunction with larger
social and societal trajectories. As Wendt (1995: 73) argues, “material
resources only acquire meaning for human action through the structure of
shared knowledge in which they are embedded.” In other words, technology
can be an influential factor within the international system (Adler, 1997), but
its impact cannot be understood without the social layers within which it is
embedded. And while there is a general possibility for systemic change, such
change is crucially not brought about by the invention or implementation of
new technologies, but by changing norms and values. As Wendt (1995: 81)
puts it, “to analyze the social construction of international politics is to ana-
lyze how processes of interaction produce and reproduce the social structures
– cooperative or conflictual – that shape actors’ identities and interests and
the significance of their material contexts.”
This brief summary of mainstream IR theories and their stance toward
technology, although certainly not doing enough justice to decades of
debates and theory-building, illustrates how technology, against the back-
drop of the discipline’s defining question (i.e. change and stability within the
international system), has predominantly been conceptualized as an external
variable that exerts influence on international politics, but that is in itself
little political. In other words, IR scholars were for the most part interested
in technology as a tool that has the capacities to amplify power, foster pro-
cesses of globalization, or play a role in the emergence of norms and iden-
tities. IR has, however, shown surprisingly little interest in unpacking
technology – that is in investigating how technologies are being constructed
or how they become implemented and used in specific institutional or
organizational contexts. In a lifecycle of technology that covers different
stages from basic and applied research; engineering and design; implementa-
tion, practice, and maintenance; to eventual “death” or replacement, IR was
thus first and foremost interested in how already available and implemented
technologies interfere with politics and society (Fritsch, 2011).
McCarthy (2013, 2018) attributes this externalization to a predominant
determinist understanding of technology that can be encountered through-
out most of IR, either in instrumentalist or essentialist terms. An instru-
mentalist understanding of technology presupposes that technology is a
neutral tool that only acquires meaning through its use and resulting social
and political practices. The assumption here is that technology could be
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fully controlled by humans and could thus serve as a means to pre-specified
ends. In IR, this idea can be encountered most clearly in realist accounts
that see (military) technology as a means to enhance the capacities to wage
war, and therefore to gain power vis-à-vis other states. An instrumentalist
understanding of technology thereby results, as demonstrated, in the inevit-
able externalization of technology as a variable that influences the inter-
national system, but is itself not an integral part of that system.
Essentialism, on the other hand, conceptualizes technology as a central
driving force for progress. Essentialist variants of determinism are under-
pinned by a strong belief in teleological progress, and by the idea that social
and economic constraints can be overcome by technological innovation.
Dahlberg (1973), for example, identifies a “technological ethic” that is
deeply embedded within Western values and politics, and that is character-
ized by scientific rationalization, an exploitative control of nature, the
search for perfection, an increasing functional specialization, and novel
forms of mobility. For him, technology in all these manifestations directly
impacts the exercise of politics. As he argues, “it should be clear that the
contexts of international relations, the behavior of most relevant actors, and
even our understandings of international relations are strongly but variously
colored by the technological ethic” (Dahlberg, 1973: 84). Others, such as
Mumford (1970) or Winner (1977), have put forward a more pessimistic
reading of the presupposed essentialist characteristics of technology, as they
regard faith in technological innovation as more dangerous than liberating,
and caution against unforeseen consequences and side effects from the
implementation of new technologies at scale.
Independent of whether one favors an optimistic or pessimistic general
stance towards technology, framing technology as deterministic is analytic-
ally compatible with the discipline’s focus on explaining change and stability
in the international system. At the same time, however, such a perspective
reduces technology to something that is already given and that changes the
world from the outside. Determinist accounts of technology thus fail to
take into account how technologies come into being and how existing
social, political, and economic structures are always already imprinted on
them. Even though within Strategic Studies there is a sustained tradition of
research around the theme of technological innovation (e.g., Parker, 1988;
Rosen, 1991; Farrell and Terriff, 2002), these perspectives seldom go beyond
a determinist understanding of technology as an instrument that needs to
be developed in order to create (military) power capacities.
More recently, a number of IR scholars have expressed a general discontent
with the determinist analytical treatment of technology as an externalized
explanatory variable for change/stability in the international system (e.g.,
Herrera, 2003, 2006; Fritsch, 2011, 2014; Mayer et al., 2014; Salter, 2015a;
Davidshofer et al., 2017; McCarthy, 2018). These authors claim that techno-
logical development and technological practices must not be separated from the
social, political, and economic structures in which they are embedded. This has
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already resulted in detailed accounts of issues as diverse as transnational business
governance (Porter, 2014), the legal expertise surrounding the use of drones and
targeted killings (Leander, 2013), or the socio-technical construction of airport
security (Schouten, 2014; Valkenburg and van der Ploeg, 2015; Hoijtink, 2017).
These contributions highlight the open-endedness of processes of technological
development and demonstrate that technology is never the neutral tool that it is
often presented to be. On the contrary, technological development and deploy-
ment is highly political and subject to social, institutional, economic and material
possibilities and constraints, alongside preferences of developers, engineers, and
designers.
Taking seriously Herrera’s (2003: 566) claim that “technology needs to be
endogenous to politics,” an understanding of technology as socially con-
structed helps us to overcome the determinist ontologies that have prevented
the unpacking of technology within mainstream IR. Most notably, such a
perspective on technology emphasizes the need to replace the totalizing
imaginary of a master (human)/slave (machine) relationship – or vice-versa,
depending on whether one favors an optimistic or pessimistic stance – with
the idea of complex socio-technical systems in which humans and machines
work together. This, as we will argue in the below, also opens up the study
of technology for an understanding of agency as emergent through the
interaction between human and non-human elements.
Agency in IR: agents, structures, relations
In IR, agency has been most prominently discussed as part of the “agent-
structure problem” (Wendt, 1987). Starting from the question whether
human agency or the social structure within which it is embedded deter-
mines international action, debates about agency have mostly been con-
cerned with how to situate agency and structure vis-à-vis each other, as well
as vis-à-vis monocausal structuralist or intentionalist theories (e.g., Dessler,
1989; Hollis and Smith, 1991; Doty, 1997; Wight, 1999). Most approaches
to the agent-structure problem depart from the assumption that agency and
structure are mutually constitutive, and thus look for ways of accommodat-
ing both in the analysis of international politics. Wendt (1987), for example,
has suggested a “constructionist” framework that he regards as capable of
accounting for the constraints that international actors face with regard to
social structures, but also for the power that these actors possess to trans-
form the structures within which they are embedded.
Despite the fact there is still a lack of shared agreement in IR about what
agency actually means (Wight, 2006), agency is in IR usually considered as
an exclusive concern of the human domain. This ties in neatly with much of
modernist philosophy and social theory that, in the vein of the Cartesian
split between mind and matter, places the liberal subject at the center of its
ontology. This anthropocentric perspective rests on the presupposition that
only humans possess consciousness and free will, and should therefore
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occupy a preeminent position in the world. In this tradition, a boundary
between the human world and the non-human world thus separates the con-
scious subject from the unconscious matter with which it is surrounded –
supported by a Newtonian account of physics that presupposes the exist-
ence of universal natural laws that explain the causal forces which move
otherwise lifeless matter. Much of mainstream social science theory, includ-
ing IR, subscribes to such a scientific analytical paradigm that is predicated
upon the identification of causal mechanisms in order to explain social and
political action (Jackson, 2017). The capacity to act would from such a per-
spective necessarily be constrained to humans vis-à-vis the social structures
they create.
Such an angle does however not problematize the notion of agency itself,
as it brackets the question who can be an actor in the first place. Inspired
by sociological accounts of agency (Emirbayer and Mische, 1998), Jackson
and Nexon (1999) have thus suggested to analytically foreground the ways
in which agency is produced through relations and the social and political
entities that they produce and stabilize. Instead of homing in on the possi-
bilities for human agency against the backdrop of social structures, they
direct our attention to action itself, and how agency can be retraced back-
wards and located in interaction. The relational perspective proposed by
Jackson and Nexon has several implications. First of all, it opens up the
analytical toolbox of IR for influences from beyond the discipline. A rela-
tional understanding of agency speaks closely to various approaches from
STS and New Materialism, and IR scholars have started to explore how
these approaches can be productively integrated into IR. We will engage
with these encounters in more detail below.
Second, it presupposes an empirical rather than a theoretical research
agenda (Braun et al., 2018). If (political) agency emerges through inter-
action, detailed study of these interactions is paramount. Importantly,
this implies that there must not be a totalizing account of what agency
is or what it does. Rather, agency must by definition be understood as
multiple, variegated, and context dependent. This again speaks closely to
the sociological and anthropological tradition of empirical (ethno-
graphic) study of scientific and technological practices in STS. STS
scholars have foregrounded the analytical importance of empirical sites
of inquiry, most prominently embodied in the move to study the
“laboratory” as the site where scientific facts are produced and start
their journey to make an impact on the world (e.g., Latour and Wool-
gar, 1979; Lynch, 1985; Knorr-Cetina, 1995). And even though STS
work has by no means been restricted to laboratory studies, the insight
that context matters for the ways in which technologies are rendered
into socio-technical systems and transform the ways in which we act is
persistently important.
Third, an understanding of agency as emergent through interaction does not
exclude non-human elements. This acknowledgment is key when we think of
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algorithmic and robotic technologies and the socio-technical systems that they
constitute. As we have outlined in the beginning of this introduction, the
notion of the socio-technical system challenges an understanding of non-
human elements as passive objects that are fully subjected to human agency,
and rather encourages us to study the role of objects in the constitution of
agency, as they share or split workload together with humans. As such, a rela-
tional perspective on agency by definition challenges the modernist anthropo-
centric ontology. It thereby speaks closely to a broad body of scholarship
under the title of New Materialism, which brings together a range of scholars
from different theoretical and disciplinary backgrounds, including post- or
anti-humanism, critical or speculative realism, chaos theory, complexity theory,
object-oriented metaphysics, modern vitalism, or philosophy of becoming
(Connolly, 2013b: 399; Coole, 2013: 452).
What New Materialism scholars, despite their variegated theoretical
roots, have in common is their refusal to uphold the anthropocentrism that
has long dominated modernist and liberal philosophy and social theory. As
Coole and Frost (2010: 8) argue, “modern philosophy has variously por-
trayed humans as rational, self-aware, free, and self-moving agents” that
exercise dominance over nature and technology – and it is precisely this
ontological divide that has enticed New Materialist scholars to search for
alternative ways of framing the relationship between the human and non-
human elements of the world. Seminal contributions by scholars such as
Bennett (2010), Barad (2007), Haraway (1991), or Hayles (2006) focus not
only on the role of science and technology within society, but also widen
the analytical scope to the ontological status of materiality itself. Starting
from the assumption that “materiality is always something more than
‘mere’ matter: an excess, force, vitality, relationality, or difference that ren-
ders matter active, self-creative, productive, unpredictable” (Coole and
Frost, 2010: 9), New Materialism scholars subscribe to an ontology of com-
plexity and emergence in the context of which natural elements, techno-
logical artifacts, animals, and humans interact in creative and partly
unforeseeable ways. From such a perspective, as Barad (2007: 33) writes,
“the world’s radical aliveness comes to light in an entirely nontraditional
way that reworks the nature of both relationality and aliveness.” Such a per-
spective then allows for novel modes of analyzing the social, the political,
and the economic as domains that are no longer produced by human deci-
sion-making and actions alone, but by entangled, emergent, and generative
powers that include a variety of non-human actors and effects.
Bennett (2010) aptly illustrates how such an understanding of the rele-
vance of non-human forces plays out through her account of the 2003
power blackout in the US Midwest and Northeast and Canadian Ontario,
which affected about 50 million people and lasted, in some regions, for an
entirety of 4 days (U.S.-Canada Power System Outage Task Force, 2004: 1).
Leading to the failure of the electricity grid, a chain of cascading interaction
effects, almost without human interferences, unfolded such major damage to
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the grid that not even fail-safe measures could prevent the blackout. As
Bennett (2010: 25) writes:
[W]hat seems to have happened on that August day was that several ini-
tially unrelated generator withdrawals in Ohio and Michigan caused the
electron flow pattern to change over the transmission lines, which led,
after a series of events including one brush fire that burnt a transmis-
sion line and then several wire-tree encounters, to a successive overload-
ing of other lines and a vortex of disconnects. One generating plant
after another separated from the grid, placing more and more stress on
the remaining participants.
In other words, one thing had led to another, with the notion of “the thing” here
referring to something that is explicitly non-human. The seemingly banal
acknowledgment that “the international, the globe, the world is made up of
things, of stuff, of objects, and not simply of humans and their ideas” (Salter,
2015a: vii), and more importantly, the acknowledgment that these things can
contribute to the constitution of agency through interaction with humans and
other things, has more recently gained increasing traction within IR. Scholars
have for example started to explore neoliberal capitalist practices as an interplay
of social, geological, biological, and climate systems (Connolly, 2013a, 2013b),
the materiality of conflict and the importance of forensic knowledge about
material objects in the context of investigating human rights violations (Walters,
2014), the socio-technical assemblages of digital security practices (Bellanova
and Duez, 2012), or the material dimensions of infrastructure and its implication
for the politics of infrastructure protection (Aradau, 2010), and have made
material aspects of the international sphere the subject of edited collections
(Acuto and Curtis, 2014; Salter, 2015b, 2016) and special issues in academic jour-
nals (Srnicek et al., 2013).
Particularly with regard to technologies that do things that humans
simply cannot do themselves (e.g., recognizing and engaging an incoming
hostile missile within seconds; extracting patterns from millions of database
entries; simultaneously monitoring and analyzing multiple video streams),
the possibility for non-exclusively human agency has provoked a number of
regulatory and ethical debates. Is the current legal system, for example, cap-
able of accommodating actions that have not been consciously carried out
by humans? Could machines ever act in a morally responsible fashion? And
if not, where must accountability and responsibility be located when
humans and computer systems work together, but the system does things
that the human operator could not do themselves? The modernist-liberal
imaginary of agency revolves around the conscious individual and its vol-
itional decision-making, leading to eventual action and consequences in the
world. This causal chain establishes the possible allocation of responsibility
for one’s actions, both in the courtroom and morally speaking. A notion of
agency that is “decoupled from criteria of intentionality, subjectivity, and
How (not) to talk about technology 13
free-will” (Sayes, 2014: 141) however fundamentally complicates the causal
chain of reasoning that is elemental to the idea of responsibility.
If collectives, assemblages, networks, and mediating coalitions are concep-
tualized as pertinent for the production and reproduction of agency, then it
becomes increasingly difficult to apply traditional legal and ethical categor-
ies. Such questions not only have practical appeal vis-à-vis the challenges
that algorithmic and robotic technologies pose, but they also strike at the
core of what it means to be a human being in this world. As Coole and
Frost (2010: 4) put forward,
what is at stake here is nothing less than a challenge to some of the
most basic assumptions that have underpinned the modern world,
including its normative sense of the human and its beliefs about human
agency, but also regarding its material practices such as the ways we
labor on, exploit, and interact with nature.
A symmetrical understanding of ontology would indeed prescribe an ethical
responsibility of acting within and with the world, rather than acting vis-à-
vis the world.
Studying technology and agency in IR
This book addresses the question how agency, understood as an emergent
form of interaction within socio-technical systems, comes to matter within
international politics. The ways in which agency comes into being and with
what repercussions must however, due to the empirical multiplicity and con-
text sensitivity of interactions between humans and non-humans, by defin-
ition always remain situated and partial. This means that a general theory
of Technology and Agency in International Relations is hardly possible. Such
a generalization is, however, neither desirable nor is it what we are striving
for here. The contributions to this book offer careful empirical analyses that
place socio-technical systems within their political, legal, economic, ethical,
cultural, and organizational contexts and explore how agency emerges and
comes to matter. Situating technology within specific contexts thereby
enables them to problematize the notion of agency and its transformations
and effects in international politics. At the same time, it allows the authors
to demonstrate that agency comes into being in variegated ways: voluntarily
or involuntarily; planned or emergent; structured or chaotic. Thinking
about technology and agency through these relations and interactions then
arguably allows us to more systematically understand the implications of
algorithmic and robotic technologies for international politics.
The point of analyzing agency through the study of interaction in socio-
technical systems is to account for plurality and complexity, and to do so in
ways that allow us to come to terms with such plurality and complexity
rather than to homogenize or totalize the role of technology in international
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politics and the ways in which it becomes part of political action. The study
of technology and agency in IR in this sense, as Claudia Aradau (this
volume) puts forward, thrives on the incorporation of multiple theoretical
and methodological perspectives that allow us to embrace complexity and
plurality – and thereby challenge the long-standing preference for parsimo-
nious theory-building in IR. This book should in this sense be understood
as an invitation to draw upon a multiplicity of approaches and concepts in
research on technology and agency. Whereas the contributions to the book
are united by the attempt to productively problematize agency and technol-
ogy, they do so by means of a diverse conceptual toolbox.
Mareile Kaufmann (this volume) in her analysis of algorithms for predict-
ive policing, Georgios Glouftsios (this volume) in his account of the con-
struction of the Visa Information System for European border
management, and Malcolm Campbell-Verduyn (this volume) in his investi-
gation of blockchain technology and its implications for international finan-
cial regulation, all draw on the Social Construction of Technology (SCOT)
literature. SCOT scholars suggest that we conceptualize technology as
enmeshed with discursive and material networks, as well as with the hetero-
geneous controversies, conflicts, and discourses that surround them (e.g.,
Latour and Woolgar, 1979; Callon, 1980, 1986b; Hughes, 1983; Bijker et al.,
1987; Mackenzie and Wajcman, 1999). Building on a strong notion of con-
structivism, SCOT approaches reject the teleological assumptions that essen-
tialist forms of determinism posit, and instead highlight the open-endedness
of processes of technological development. By means of empirical engage-
ment with the various stages through which technologies emerge, SCOT
scholars emphasize that technology is never the neutral tool that it is often
presented to be. On the contrary, technological development and deploy-
ment is highly political and subject to social, institutional, economic and
material possibilities and constraints, alongside preferences of developers,
engineers, and designers.
Kaufmann’s chapter (this volume) in this vein provides us with an inter-
esting account of the life cycle of a technology, as it traces algorithms for
predictive policing purposes from the cradle to the grave. Drawing on inter-
views with police staff, software developers, and programmers, she engages
the consecutive stages of (pre-)conception, birth, adolescence, graduation,
implementation, and death, and sketches out how each of these stages
becomes subject to negotiation, controversy, and organizational and infra-
structural requirements. While Kaufmann’s research was initially “only”
interested in questions of agency, she soon finds that larger social and polit-
ical trajectories took center stage during the analysis of empirical data. To
be able to understand the workings and effects of data and algorithms for
predictive policing, she thus argues, a range of other elements need to be
taken into account, including the importance of a longer history of technol-
ogy in police work and attitudes towards data and digital methods within
the police.
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Glouftsios’ (this volume) analysis of the Visa Information System (VIS) –
a large-scale IT system that was designed for the management of the Euro-
pean border framework – follows a similar approach. Building on ethno-
graphic fieldwork and expert interviews, he highlights the dispersed ways in
which the VIS emerged throughout a multi-year process that included a var-
iety of heterogeneous elements and actors. As he follows the VIS through
variegated instances of design, technical feasibility studies, political negoti-
ations, calculations, draftings, and re-draftings, Glouftsios manages to expli-
cate how in the construction of technology, networks of heterogeneous
elements are being tied together and rendered productive. He thereby force-
fully demonstrates how multiple human and non-human elements, such as
EU bureaucrats and security experts, servers, network cables, interfaces, and
algorithms are involved in the constitution of the VIS system, and by exten-
sion, in the very practicing of border security, migration management and
law enforcement in the EU and its neighborhood.
Another prominent way to study agency and technology in IR is through
the toolbox of Actor-Network Theory (ANT), as adopted by a number of
the contributions in this volume (Olbrich, this volume; Glouftsios, this
volume; Kaufmann, this volume). ANT, as advanced by Callon, Law,
Latour, and others (e.g., Callon, 1984, 1986a; Law, 1986, 1992; Latour,
2005), has been particularly prominent in IR in recent years (e.g., Barry,
2013; Best and Walters, 2013; Bueger, 2013; Nexon and Pouliot, 2013; Pas-
soth and Rowland, 2015). It starts from the assumption that social effects
are produced by heterogeneous networks of actants that comprise social
and technical parts, including organizations and institutions as much as
things, artefacts, and humans. Each of these elements should be seen as
equally important to the network, as they produce and re-produce social
order in a joint fashion. ANT presupposes that all of the elements of the
network are relevant for actions, whether their actions emerge in a deliber-
ate (human) fashion or not. Latour (2005) therefore suggests using the term
“actant” as opposed to the liberal expression of the “actor,” as the notion
of the actant indicates that action is not necessarily tied to human intention
or consciousness. Such a perspective then allows for more suitable modes of
understanding non-human action. As Latour (2005: 71) has famously
argued: “If action is limited a priori to what ‘intentional,’ ‘meaningful’
humans do, it is hard to see how a hammer, a basket, a door closer, a cat, a
rug, a mug, a list, or a tag could act.”
One of the things that ANT then brings to the study of international pol-
itics is a concern with the place of non-humans in political life and the
effects of relational practices between humans and non-humans. From an
ANT perspective, agency is always entangled and distributed. In addition,
an ANT approach advances the study of technology in international politics
by drawing specific attention to the link between situated and local practices
of knowledge production and their broader effects, or to how particular
knowledge claims or truth claims gain content and political importance.
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In his chapter on the use of satellite imagery for the monitoring of human
rights abuses, Philipp Olbrich (this volume) draws on ANT to point out
how satellite technology becomes a participant in the making and re-
making of North Korea as a security threat and pariah state. For Olbrich,
the use of satellite technology has a key impact on what can be known (or
not known) about human rights abuses, conflict, or political violence on
a global scale. In turn, what is presented as evidence through the use of
satellite technology has important effects for how the international com-
munity engages with North Korea – or, rather, disengages with North
Korea, as practices of satellite surveillance reify the image of North Korea
as a pariah state and further limit the potential for dialogue. Finally, as
Olbrich shows, in the process of making North Korea visible and produ-
cing evidence, satellite imagery itself remains largely unquestioned. In fact,
in the process of conducting satellite surveillance, satellite technology is
further reified as an objective, neutral, and desirable way of examining
human rights violations.
Applying a slightly different perspective on the relations between humans
and technology and the resulting effects for the production of agency, the
contributions by Katja Lindskov Jacobsen and Linda Monsees (this
volume) and Malcolm Campbell-Verduyn (this volume) are informed by
Sheila Jasanoff’s (2004) work on co-production. Jacobsen and Monsees
argue that the concept of co-production – even though somewhat under-
acknowledged within IR – is particularly suitable for studying technology
and technological agency in international politics. For them, the way in
which co-production places specific emphasis on how science and technol-
ogy, or the making of scientific knowledge or facts, affects social order and
hierarchies has important analytical value in the sense that it re-introduces
key questions in IR, such as global power, inequality, and norms. Camp-
bell-Verduyn’s inquiry into the governance of international finance fore-
grounds the political and economic perception of blockchain technology
that changes from a framing of the blockchain as a threat to established
financial institutions to the incorporation of blockchain technology within
the liberal capitalist system. He highlights the role of blockchain technology
as co-productive of the transformation of international finance, arguing that
the blockchain has produced and legitimized the power of its users, while at
the same time being subjected to the influence of its users. Forms of polit-
ical agency that are produced through this interaction between human and
technological authority then unfolded global repercussions in the sense that
they provided the conditions for further extending liberal governance
modalities in the wake of the 2008 global financial crisis. Both Campbell-
Verduyn and Jacobsen and Monsees manage, through the concept of
co-production, to explicate how both discursive and material aspects of
technology come to matter in the ways in which agency is produced.
This relation between discourse and materiality is also key in the work of
Suchman (2007, 2012) that Leese (this volume) mobilizes in his analysis of
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human-machine relations in military weapons systems. In order to under-
stand what might be at stake in the future of warfare against the backdrop
of potentially “autonomous” weapons systems, Suchman’s concept of con-
figuration for him provides a productive lens, as it directs analytical atten-
tion to the specific ways in which humans and machines share or split
tasks, and how their relationship revolves around notions of automation
and control. Leese’s analysis in this sense highlights the role of cultural ima-
ginaries that inform the construction of socio-technical systems, and par-
ticularly the idea of “meaningful human control” over automated system
functions. In doing so, he draws specific attention to the presupposed
boundary between humans and computers that is within socio-technical sys-
tems engendered through the notion of human control.
A slightly different perspective is applied by Alex Edney-Browne (this
volume) in her analysis of visuality within practices of drone warfare. In
order to demonstrate what can go wrong when humans and technologies
work together, she engages practices of drone warfare and how the fallibili-
ties of human-machine interaction on the battlefield can unfold lethal conse-
quences. Building on visual IR theories and critical military studies, she
puts forward powerful concerns with regard to the growing authority of
visual technologies in military affairs. As she works through the notions of
failure and fallibility, Edney-Browne’s analysis points to the importance of
examining and uncovering the flaws that are inherent in algorithmic and
robotic technologies and the socio-technical systems that they comprise.
Such a critical stance then challenges techno-fetishization and questions
military institutions’ embellishments about their technological capabilities.
Finally, in her reflections on technology and agency in international polit-
ics, Claudia Aradau (this volume) urges us to expand our analytical toolbox
even further, by also including feminist and post-colonial perspectives on
technology and agency and by paying explicit attention to the multiplicity
and debates within STS and IR. In our interview with her, which serves as
a conclusion to the book, Aradau elaborates, among other things, on ques-
tions of the global circulation of technology, the role of technology in the
production of knowledge and broader issues of secrecy, critique, and polit-
ics. Aradau thereby draws particular attention to the ways in which distrib-
uted and entangled modes of agency produce specific forms of knowledge,
or act upon our bodies in specific ways. According to her, a symmetric read-
ing of the world could and should still lead to an engagement with how
asymmetric relations of power, authority, and knowledge are produced. This
would then also direct attention to questions of who or what gets to speak
and act, or what counts as evidence. For her, these questions are under-
pinned by particular relations between actors, but also by the technologies,
forms of equipment and instruments that these actors can have or interact
with.
Overall, IR scholars have in recent years made sustained and encouraging
efforts to render ideas and concepts from STS and New Materialism
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productive for the study of the international, which has resulted in a variety
of efforts to re-appropriate our understanding of technology and agency in
international contexts. However, as Salter (2015a: xviii–xix) notes, these
efforts still resemble a “party not quite in full swing.” In other words, there
remains much empirical and conceptual work to do. With this book, we
hope to offer a contribution to the debates by foregrounding the importance
of agency, specifically with regard to algorithmic and robotic technologies.
If we perceive of agency in relational and entangled forms that emerge
through the interactions between heterogeneous elements, we should turn
our attention to these interactions, and the ways in which they bind
humans and non-humans together. A “flat” or symmetric reading of ontol-
ogy as proposed by STS and New Materialist scholars then not only
requires us to rethink what it means to act in the world, but also raises a
set of questions that concern the ways in which international politics are
structured.
Notes
1 Being aware of the risk to oversimplify the many different types of technologies
that hold relevance for international politics, we will throughout this introduction
refer to “algorithmic and robotic technologies,” as this term covers both physical
(“hardware”) and digital (“software”) aspects. The most intense debates about
technology can usually be encountered when both of these aspects are combined,
i.e. when technologies are rendered “intelligent” based on sensing and algorithmic
processing capacities, while at the same time able to move around and interact
with their environment.
2 When we speak here of politics in relation to technology, we do not refer to regu-
latory debates or to the governance of technology, but rather to the ways in
which technology is embedded in politics and/or has political effects by means of
its interaction with humans.
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